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If you are eating right now, I urge you to read this later. There
are just certain things about food that most of us would just rather not think
about. Whether we like it or not, however, every single thing that we eat or
drink in a day is composed in part of things we would not prefer to consume -
such as rodent hairs, rodent excrement and insect wings.
This unpalatable matter, collectively referred to in regulations and
for the purposes of this paper as lth, is monitored by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.1 FDA has
established defect action levels (DALs) for the amount of lth permitted in
food. The DALs represent the amount of lth which FDA considers unavoidable.
Periodic inspection of production facilities and testing of shipments of food are
FDA's primary means of assessing compliance with DALs. Of course, FDA
can not hope to reach more than a minute portion of the food supply or the
factories, mills and farms which produce it. However, it is hoped that the
penalty for noncompliance, seizure and condemnation of the contaminated food,
with accompanying economic loss, will encourage the food industry to follow the
DALs.
FDA has also established procedures for food salvage, means by
which manufacturers can recondition food and manufacturing processes to elim-
inate contamination. One restriction on this is that food may not be blended,
meaning that one lot of food which is above the required DAL can not be mixed
with food below the level to bring the entire mixture into compliance. This
limitation has come under increasing re from those within the food indus-
try, particularly with regard to lth not resulting from failure to comply with
good manufacturing processes. While remaining rmly committed to its present
policy, purposely declining to change existing regulations, FDA has shown ex-
ibility on some occasions, which has only further angered those who oppose the
current FDA policy.
This paper begins with a brief discussion, for illustrative purposes,
of the evolution of regulations for reconditioning in the food salvage industry,
and present requirements for reconditioning adulterated food. It then describes
121 U,S.C. 321 et. seq. [hereinafter FD&C Act].
1the current FDA policy with regard to blending, and the theory behind the
prohibition of this particular method of reconditioning adulterated food.
Part B shows the application of the rule against blending to indi-
vidual cases. It begins with several cases in which the general rule was followed
and blending was not allowed. It then dexcribes a case in which FDA discretion
to prohibit blending was questioned in the context of exports.
Part C describes a situation which occurred in the late 1970s, when
corn produced in the southeastern part of the country became widely contam-
inated with aatoxin, a carcinogen. FDA made an exception to the blending
policy in the aatoxin case, allowing contaminated corn to be blended with pure
corn for feeding to animals. This ignited a controversy which still exists today.
Part D takes a more detailed look at the increasing controversy
over the blending policy, and its eect on the perception of FDA regulations.
Courts have concluded that FDA has the power to grant such exceptions, but
the prospect of case by case analysis has prompted strenuous arguments for
change. Some have called for an end to DALs, or at the very least some clarity
as to the meaning of compliance guidelines. Others have argued that regardless
of whether FDA's power to grant exceptions in individual cases may be deemed
arbitrary, it may be more important to look at procedures for blending so that
food will not be wasted when so many are starving around the world.
A. General Policies
Food is considered adulterated within the meaning of section 402(a)
of the FD&C Act
(3) if it consists in whole or in part of any lthy, putrid or decom-
posed substance, or if it is otherwise unt for food; or
(4) if it has been prepared, packed or held under unsanitary conditions
whereby it may have become contaminated with lth, or whereby it may have
been rendered injurious to health. 2
FDA has sought to prevent food adulteration by the establishment
of Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP's),3including general criteria
and specic regulations for particular types of food.4 When CGMP's are vio-
lated, FDA also has determined and regulated the limited circumstances under
which such food may be oered to the public.
1. Food Salvage Code
One such set of regulations is the Model Food Salvage Code.5 In a
report issued in 1975, the General Accounting Oce (GAO) revealed that food
being distributed to the public through foodsalvage outlets was being processed,
packaged and held under unsanitary conditions.6 GAO found that food for sale
221 U.S.C. 342(a)(3), (4).
321 C.F.R. 110; 51 Fed. Reg. 22458, 22476 (June 19, 1986).
4See eq. 44 Fed. Reg. 16215 (March 7, 1979) (regarding thermally processed low-acid
foods packaged in hermetically sealed containers).
5Announced at 49 Fed. Reg. 31952 (August 9, 1984).
6GAO, Need for Regulating the Food Salvage Industry to Prevent Sale of Unwholesome
and Misbranded Foods to the Public, No. MWD-75-64 (May 20, 1975) [hereinafter 1975 GAO
Report].
2in many salvage outlets was insuciently reconditioned and/or insect infested,7
or packaged in cans that were severely dented, rusted or otherwise damaged,
leaking or swollen,8 with misleading or missing labels.9 Because GAO found
that most of the food in salvage outlets is transported interstate for processing
or sale,it is within the sphere of FDA regulation.10
In a subsequent report issued in 1979, GAO found that the problem
remained, and reiterated its conclusion that FDA must step in to regulate these
outlets.11 One of GAO's criticisms of the Model State Code existing at the time
of its report was that it provided little specic guidance as to reconditioning.
GAO found that few states or cities surveyed had food salvage guidelines. Most
states apparently concurred with GAO's conclusion that uniform regulatory
controls were needed.12 Recognizing that FDA lacks the resources to enforce
regulations against retail establishments, and that state and local governments
have primary jurisdiction over such outlets, the Code was intended to establish
guidelines for the use of state and local food control agencies, who are best
equipped to handle retail salvage outlets. It created uniform regulatory proce-
dures for processing and packaging food for salvage operations, and a model law
which included comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.13
GAO believed that the deplorable conditions which it found in the
food salvage industry were a matter for the consideration of Congress in delib-
erating on matters of national hunger and nutrition.14 The policy justication
for specically requiring regulation of the food salvage industry is that food
from salvage outlets will most often be purchased by the urban poor, or insti-
tutions such as hospitals and nursing homes, and these consumers are entitled
to the same protection and product information as those who purchase other
food. GAO noted that the groups most likely to be aected by the condition of
salvaged food were particularly vulnerable because they had less choice of food
to eat, making it even more important that they not receive inferior and unsafe
food from salvage outlets.15
2. Requirements for Reconditioning
FDA issued its present policy regarding the reconditioning of food
considered adulterated under section 402(a)(4) of the FD&C Act, in a
revised Compliance Policy Guide.16 Proposals for reconditioning must include
a method for determining whether contamination has occurred, and the extent
and nature of any contamination which has occurred. Procedures to eliminate
both the presently existing contamination, and the environmental conditions
7Id. at 11-17; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921.
8Id. at 10; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921.
9Id. at 5-9; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921.
10Id. at 3; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921.
11GAO, Food Salvage Industry Should Be Prevented From Selling Unt and Misbranded
Food to the Public, No. HRD-79-32 (February 14, 1979).
121975 GAO Report, supra note 6 at 23; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921 at 74922.
13Id. at 25|27; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 74921 at 74922.
14Id. at iv.
15Id. at 24.
16See 54 Fed. Reg. 32395 (August 7, 1989).
3which caused it, must also be established. If the facility conditions leading to
contamination can not be corrected, the food must be moved to a sanitary place
before reconditioning can begin. In addition, sampling and testing may occur
during and after the reconditioning process, to ensure that it is successfully
completed.17
3. Natural or Unavoidable Defects and the Prohibition of Blending
Even if CGMP's are followed (and therefore section 402(a)(4) is not
violated), food may still become contaminated so as to be rendered adulterated
under the FD&C Act if it contains a lthy, putrid or decomposed substance or
is otherwise unt for food, Sale of such adulterated food would be prohibited
under section 402(a)(3). FDA determined, however, that at low levels, such
natural or unavoidable defects are not harmful. It established defect action
levels (DALs), maximum levels at which regulatory action would not be sought
against food produced under good manufacturing practices, the adulteration of
which is the result of natural or unavoidable defect.18
Presumably, food which exceeds the DAL may be reconditioned,
and corrective measures taken to improve quality controls and ensure that DALs
will be met in the future. One measure which is not permitted, however, is
blending such adulterated food with other food which is below the DAL, as 21
C.F.R. 110.110 goes on to provide:
(d) The mixing of a food containing defects above the current defect
action level with another lot of food is not permitted and renders the nal food
adulterated within the meaning of the act, regardless of the defect level of the
nal food.
When FDA initially proposed section 110.110(d) it received a num-
ber of comments objecting to the fact that the prohibition on blending was abso-
lute, regardless of the fact that the contamination was natural and unavoidable,
and not the result of violation of CGMP regulations.19 FDA refused to modify
its stance, however, and incorporated the proposed prohibition into the nal rule
17Id.
1821 C.F.R. 110.110 provides:
(a) Some foods, even when produced under current good manufacturing practice,
contain natural or unavoidable defects that at low levels are not hazardous to health. The Food
and Drug Administration establishes maximum levels for these defects in foods produced under
current good manufacturing practice and uses these levels in deciding whether to recommend
regulatory action.
(b) Defect action levels are established for foods whenever it is necessary and feasible
to do so. These levels are subject to change upon the development of new technology or the
availability of new information.
(c) Compliance with defect action levels does not excuse violation of the require-
ment of section 402(a)(4) of the act that food not be prepared, packed or held under unsanitary
conditions or the requirements in this part that food manufacturers, distributors and holders
shall observe current good manufacturing practice. Evidence indicating that such a viola-
tion exists causes the food to be adulterated within the meaning of the act, even though the
amounts of natural or unavoidable defects are lower than the currently established defect ac-
tion levels. The manufacturer, distributor, and holder of food shall at all times utilize quality
control operations that reduce natural or unavoidable defects to the lowest level currently
feasible.
1951 Fed. Reg. 22458, 22474 (June 19, 1986).
4without change, reasoning that the concern with blending is not just whether
the resulting food would be safe, but also whether it would be considered adul-
terated under the FD&C Act.20 FDA apparently concluded that although it
had previously allowed blending under certain circumstances, these should be
viewed as exceptions to a general prohibition, and such exceptions should be
sought and determined on an individual basis.21
Food which is rejected because DALs are violated could certainly
also become adulterated by failure to observe CGMPs, in violation of section
402(a)(4), but this would not result in the type of natural or unavoidable defect
which is typically the subject of a DAL. When a food is considered contaminated
because its lth content exceeds DALs, the adulteration at issue is generally
a violation of section 402(a)(3), meaning that the food consists in whole or
in part of a lthy, putrid or decomposed substance or is otherwise unt for
food. If this provision is interpreted literally, even food which has a level of
contamination below a given DAL but which does contain some lth, could be
considered adulterated. If food which is within the DAL is not to be considered
adulterated, what is the dierence between this food, and food which comes
within the DAL after blending? In either case, the level of lth present is not
harmful, meaning that the food in question is probably not otherwise unt for
food. As for the claim that the food contains some amount of a lthy, putrid
or decomposed substance, this would be equally true in any case in which there
is any lth at all, regardless of whether or not it has been blended to come
below the DAL. Therefore, I do not see why it is necessary to conclude that
food which is blended to meet a DAL should be considered adulterated under
section 402(a)(3) of the FD&C Act, and for that reason to prohibit blending.
In addition, the same policy justications which argue in favor of
regulation of the food salvage industry and reconditioning plans support the
belief that FDA should nd some way to make blending work.22 Prohibition of
a method of cleansing contamination, such as blending, is potentially as costly
as having no regulation at all for those who must rely at least to some extent
on salvaged food. The higher food is priced, the more restricted are those
with lesser income. Thus, they would become even more susceptible to harm,
from food which has been secretly and illegally blended without regulation, than
they would be if FDA found a way to utilize and regulate this process. Blending
might be seen as just another method of reconditioning which would serve to
provide a greater quantity of wholesome food at a cheaper price. Indeed, the
exceptions in which FDA has allowed blending, have occurred in situations in
which the destruction or diversion of the food in question would have had serious
consequences for the national food supply.23 However, if blending can reduce the
amount of natural or unavoidable defects in food so that it would be safe for the
public, would not the national food supply always benet from the availability
of that food instead of its destruction?
20Id.
21These exceptions, and reactions to them, will be discussed further in Part C, infra.
22As described in sections A-i and A-2, supra.
2351 Fed. Reg. 22458 at 22474, supra note 19; see also Part C, infra.
5B. Decisions Condemning Blended Food as Adulterated
As a general rule, courts have supported FDA in its contention that
blended food is adulterated as dened by section 402(a)(3) of the FD&C Act,
and therefore subject to condemnation.24 However,it has also been held that
when food has been oered for entry into interstate commerce, and is rejected
as condemned even after an attempt has been made to remove lth and bring
it in to compliance with the FD&C Act, there is no requirement that such food
must be destroyed, and manufacturers may apply for its release for the purpose
of export.25
1. Finding of Adulteration
In United States v. O.F. Bayer & Co., et. al.,26 the controversy in-
volved FDA's seizure of bags of coee sweepings. The Second Circuit found that
green coee beans, which were swept up after having been spilled in the hold
or on the deck of the ship in which they were transported, were adulterated
because they had become blended with wood splinters, bers, dust, and other
lthy substances.27 The court held that the beans were food, in spite of the
fact that they were not t for human consumption until they had been roasted,
because they were still a component of an article of food. The court found that
FDA's ruling in this regard was not clearly erroneous, and the decrees of con-
demnation should be armed.28 Claimants contended that the beans should
not be considered adulterated, because an attempt had been made to cleanse
the sweepings, and the remaining contamination would be removed by roasting.
However, the court concluded that the possibility that future processing might
eliminate contamination did not preclude a nding of present contamination
leading to condemnation.29 The court also found that it did not have the statu-
tory authority to require that FDA return the seized articles to the claimants
to permit them to be exported.30Similarly, in Suqarman v. Forbraqd,31 coee
sweepings from the oor of a ship were found to be adulterated, and were there-
fore refused admission into the country for import.32
24See section B-i, supra.
25See section B-2, supra.
26188 F.2d 555 (2nd Cir. 1951).
27Id. at 557.
28Id.
29Id.
30Id. at 557|558.
31267 F. Supp 817(N.D. Cal. 1967); armed, 405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1969).
32The bags of sweepings were rejected under section 801 of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 381,
which provides in relevant part:
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver to the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, upon his request, samples of food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics which are being
imported or oered for import into the United States, giving notice thereof to the owner or
consignee, who may appear before the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and have
the right to introduce testimony. ... If it appears from the examination of such samples or
otherwise that ... (3) such article is adulterated, misbranded, or in violation of section 355
of this title, then such article shall be refused admission, except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section. The Secretary of the treasury shall cause the destruction of any such
article refused admission unless such article is exported, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, within ninety days of the date of notice of such refusal or within
6The coee had been damaged by a re on the ship, and the water
and chemicals used to extinguish the re.33 Tests conducted by FDA on samples
of the beans indicated that they were blackened, inside and out, and had a burnt,
tar-like odor. When the beans were brewed, the resulting drink had a smoky
avor and was devoid of natural coee avor. Therefore, it was concluded
that the beans could not make an acceptable drink.34 After these tests, and
conducting a hearing at which petitioners, who had purchased the damaged
beans for salvage, could present evidence as to the admissibility of the beans or
the possibility of bringing them into compliance, FDA condemned the beans as
adulterated, and seized them.35
Petitioners then sought authorization to grind them for blending
with other coee. They contended that this would make them acceptable for
use.36 Conditional approval was granted for use of the beans for extraction of
caeine or for the production of soluble coee, provided that FDA be allowed to
examine the nished product.37 However, FDA's letter to Respondent Forbragd,
the contents of which were passed on to Petitioners, stated that:
the claimant's proposal to salvage this article under detention by grinding
and blending it with other ground coee is completely unacceptable, since this
would amount to nothing more than diluting a legal article of food with an
article which is unt for food to make a low grade nished product.
... We doubt that a satisfactory soluble coee can be produced.... If
this coee is to be utilized in making soluble coee the rm should not blend this
with other coee beans to prepare the soluble coee. The proposal to extract
caeine appears more likely to result in an acceptable nished product.38
The district court concurred with FDA's decision, noting that it
was consistent with the major functions of FDA, preserving the integrity of the
food supply, and protecting the consumer from the economic adulteration which
occurs when less expensive ingredients are substituted or used to decrease the
amount of more expensive ingredients, so that the resulting product is of inferior
quality to what the consumer would expect of a product with that name.39
Petitioners proposal, the court stated, substituted the burnt coee beans, a
such additional time as may be permitted pursuant to such regulations.
(b) ... If it appears to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that an article
included within the provisions of subsection (3) of subsection (a) of this section can, by
relabeling or other action, be brought into compliance with this chapter or rendered other
than a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, nal determination as to admission of such article
may be deferred and, upon ling of timely written application by the owner or consignee and
the execution by him of a bond as provided in the preceding provision of this subsection, the
Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare may, in accordance with regulations, authorize the applicant to perform such
relabeling or other action specied in such authorization (including destruction or export of
rejected articles or portions thereof, as may be specied in the Secretary's authorization).
33Sugarman v. Forbragd, supra note 31, at 818-819.
34Id. at 819.
35Id.
36Id. at 820.
37Id.
38Id.
39Id. at 829.
7cheapened and worthless substance, for normal coee, thereby adulterating the
good beans as surely as if they were mixed with coee grounds. The only value
of the charred coee would be to add bulk, which would allow the producers and
distributors of the coee to deceive the public, as careful blending would allow
them to pass the substance o as pure coee. Therefore, the court concluded,
FDA would have been derelict in its duties had it not prevented the proposed
blending.40
The district court also noted that under x381(a), FDA is directed
to refuse admission of food if by examination of samples or otherwise there is
the appearance of adulteration.41 There is no requirement that the samples be
found actually adulterated or that testimony from the hearing be relied on in
the decision. The court therefore concluded that the decision as to whether
the coee beans in question should be permitted entry into the country was
within the administrative discretion of FDA, and petitioners were not entitled
to judicial review of this decision.42 Agency discretion was supported, the court
said, by the fact that import hearings are informal, in stark contrast to other
types of hearings
provided for in the FD&C Act.43 As FDA's decision could not be considered
arbitrary and capricious given the facts of this case, the court found that it
should not be overturned.44
The Ninth Circuit reviewed, and armed, the portion of the district
court decision stating that FDA's ruling was not subject to judicial review.45
In more recent situations, FDA has continued to enforce its policies
against blending, issuing warnings or bringing enforcement actions in situations
in which food has become adulterated by mixture with food of less quality, or
other lth. State governments have also brought actions against producers and
distributors who have violated this policy.
For example, Lucky Stores, Inc. agreed to pay $5 million in nes
and restitution to settle charges brought by the state of California, alleging that
an investigation revealed that Lucky had deceived customers by selling adulter-
ated beef, mixing lower grade beef and pork into its high quality ground beef
products in stores throughout the state. Although it denied any wrongdoing,
Lucky also agreed to randomly test its meat to ensure that the problem would
not occur again.46
Similarly, a warning letter was sent to Cohan Seafood Co., Inc.,
from FDA's San Francisco District, after an inspection of the company's plant
was conducted in response to complaints of food poisoning after ingestion of
sh processed at the plant. Among the violations uncovered in this inspection
40Id.
41Id. at 823; see also, 21 U.S.C. x381 (x801 of FD&C Act),supra note 32.
42Id. at 824.
43Id.
44
45405 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1969).
46Lucky Agrees to Pay $5 Million in Meat Settlement. Food Chemical News (Jan-
uary 31, 1994).
8and related in the letter, was the fact that decomposed sh, and other sh of
questionable quality were stored with good sh. The warning letter indicated
that this blending of good and decomposed sh results in the adulteration of
the good sh.47
FDA has recognized the need to monitor lth even in legally blended prod-
ucts. One example of this occurred when FDA proposed DALs for Mexican
mole paste, at the request of a Mexican trade association, which noted that
mole paste is made of a mixture of natural ingredients which have the potential
to be contaminated with lth. Without DAL's, manufacturers are unsure as to
the levels of lth which would be acceptable to FDA, and various FDA oces
lack a guide for legal action which would provide consistency in that the same
level of lth would lead to the same action across the various of f ices.48
A warning letter was sent by the Dallas District to Wrangler Feedyards do
Cactus Feeders, Inc., for noncompliance with regulations for medicated feeds.
Among the violations detected was that the feed mixers had not been cleaned
between batches, resulting in the feed becoming adulterated.49
After a voluntary recall of some lots of certain kinds of butter blend prod-
ucts by Wilsey Foods, FDA expanded this recall to include all butter blend
products, as these products were indeed found to be contaminated. The source
of contamination was believed to be the whey used in the butter blends.50
Blending has also been prohibited when it has involved the mixture of whole-
some food products which are not on the label and would not be expected by
the consumer. A warning letter was issued to Uncle Ben's because its Country
Inn Chicken Stock Rice was actually a mixture of rice and an enriched macaroni
product, and this was not revealed by the product identity.51
2. questioning of FDA discretion
Carl Borschsenius Co., Inc. v. Gardner,52 the court found that FDA
did not have the authority under x801 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. S381)53 to
prohibit the export and require the destruction of coee after it had authorized
the importer to attempt to bring the coee into compliance with the FD&C
Act. Some of the coee had been damaged by contact with water. Approxi-
mately 1500 of 5000 bags in the shipment was wet, and some contained moldy
coee. The entire shipment was detained by FDA.54 Upon examination, 2325
bags were found to be sound, and were released to petitioner under a partial
release of the shipment. Petitioner also sought and received authorization to
recondition the remainder of the shipment by skimming the coee to remove
47Fish Processing Plant Linked to Possible Food Poisoning. Food Chemical News
(June 1, 1992).
48Defect Action Level For Mexican Mole Paste Proposed. Food Chemical News
(February 22, 1993)
49Warning Letters Hit Medicated Feed GMP Deviations. Food Chemical News
(June 1, 1992).
50FDA Investigating Salmonellosis Outbreak. Food Chemical News (December 2, 1991).
51Rice Product Labeling Hit In Warning Letter. Food Chemical News (June 1, 1992).
52282 F.Supp 396 (E.D.La. 1968).
53see note 32, supra.
54Id. at 397|398.
9molded beans and drying it out to remove the wet beans, to attempt to bring it
in to compliance with the FD&C Act. After reconditioning, 1730 bags had been
made sound. Of the remainder, 1053 bags had not been reconditioned because
they were too moldy to skim.55
FDA issued a release notice, stating that it would release the bags
which had been made sound, as soon as petitioner destroyed the other bags.
Petitioner, however, sought to recover the bags which had not been recondi-
tioned, for export, claiming that they would have substantial commercial value
in other countries in their present condition. The Acting FDA Director denied
this request, stating that had petitioner's original intention been to export the
entire lot without attempting to bring it into compliance, this would have been
acceptable. However, as this coee had been subjected to reconditioning, and
the coee which had sustained the most damage and could not be successfully
reconditioned was at issue, this portion could not be exported.56
FDA moved to dismiss petitioner's action. One of the grounds
for this motion was that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter.
FDA contended that it was acting within the scope of its discretionary authority
under the FD&C Act.57 Thus, the question was whether FDA had the discretion
under x801(b) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. x381(b)), to require the destruction
of articles oered for import which are rejected because they can not be brought
into compliance.58
The court held that FDA's decision was at variance with congres-
sional policy as to the disposition of articles rejected for admission as set out in
x801(a) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. x381(a)), as well as other Acts which al-
lowed an importer the opportunity to export goods rejected for import.59 After
reviewing several of these Acts, the court concluded that FDA had discretion
to require destruction if the articles were of a type which it was unlawful un-
der any circumstances to import, and therefore they were unlawfully oered for
import, or if health and safety considerations required the destruction of the
item.60 The court went on to note that attempting to bring the articles into
compliance would not render them involved in illegal import activity. Thus, the
parenthetical mention of destruction in x801(b) does not limit the language of
x801(a), which leaves the discretion with the consignee of the goods to export
them within 90 days, after which time they may be ordered destroyed if they
have not been exported.61
The only policy justication to support FDA's contention that the
coee should be destroyed, the court said, is its duty to preserve the integrity
of the food supply by assuring that adulterated food does not secretly enter the
national food supply, which it would argue can only be assured by requiring
55Id. at 398.
56Id.
57Id. at 399|400.
58Id. at 400.
59Id. at 402.
60Id. at 403.
61Id. at 404.
10destruction of adulterated food. However, the court said that this was not
one of the purposes of x801(b).62 Therefore, the court held that the refusal to
release for export the coee which had not been reconditioned, and conditioning
the release of the sound coee on the destruction of the adulterated coee was
outside the boundaries of FDA discretion.63
C. Exceptions to FDA's policy against blending
As has been discussed above, FDA's general policy prohibits blend-
ing. However, there have been occasional exceptions to this policy, and this has
led to controversy. FDA maintains that these exceptions should be on a case
by case basis, and the general policy should be unchanged. There is growing
support, however, for the creation of a more specic policy, and to allow blend-
ing under certain circumstances. This section will describe one of the major
deviations from the blending policy, which initiated much of the controversy
which persists today. It will then discuss the ensuing controversy, which will
lead into the discussion in Section D, Supra, of some of the theories and policy
justications supporting more liberal use of blending as a method of cleansing
to bring food within established DALs.
1. the aatoxin exception
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, FDA twice granted an exemption to the
blending policy for corn contaminated with aatoxin. The rst such occurrence
was in 1978, when the exemption was granted to seven southeastern states in
which heavy rains had resulted in levels of aatoxin above DALs in as much
as 40% or perhaps even more than half of the corn crop of the 1977 growing
season.64
In these limited circumstances, FDA allowed the blending of corn
unavoidably contaminated by levels of aatoxin above DALs, with uncontam-
inated corn, provided that the contaminated corn had not been shipped in
interstate commerce prior to FDA's approval of a technically feasible blending
plan, that the blended corn met the relevant DAL of 20 parts per billion of
aatoxin, and that the blended corn was only used in certain animal feed, and
not diverted to other uses, including feed for young or milk-producing animals,
and human consumption. If contamination was found to result from inadequate
drying or improper storage, it was deemed avoidable and therefore not eligible
for the exemption.65
The reason for the exemption was that to prohibit the use of the
contaminated corn would have a substantial adverse impact on the national food
supply. Under the authority of 21 C.F.R. 609.8,66the Commissioner of FDA is
permitted to allow exemptions if it is determined that the blended food is safe
for consumption and that destruction or diversion of the food involved would
substantially aect the national food supply. Having reviewed the evidence
regarding aatoxin in feed corn, the FDA Commissioner determined that this
62Id.
63Id. at 405.
64See 43 Fed. Reg. 14122 (April 4, 1978).
65Id.
66issued at 42 Fed. Reg. 52822 (September 30, 1977).
11limited exemption would not perceivably increase the health risk to mature
poultry and swine and mature non-milk producing beef cattle to whom aected
corn would be fed, nor to humans who would consume the meat of such animals.
The Commissioner also determined that to continue the prohibition on blending,
which would require the destruction of this food, would result in the required
substantial eect. Thus, the exemption was granted.67
A similar exemption was granted in 1981 for the 1980 corn crop
in North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia, in order to prevent aadverse
impact on the national food supply.68 Samples of corn from the aected states
showed levels of aatoxin contamination at least as severe, if not worse than,
that which occurred in 1978.69 The exemption was once again premised on 21
C.F.R. x509.8. As with the earlier exemptions, these states were required to
develop plans for interstate shipping and blending of the contaminated corn,
which would be approved by FDA, to ensure that contaminated corn would not
be diverted to other uses.70
One dierence between this and the earlier exemption, however,
was that corn containing a level up to 100 parts per billion could be shipped in
interstate commerce, to feed mature poultry, and mature non-milk producing
livestock. Corn could be blended to achieve this level.71 This opportunity was
not presented in the earlier notice, which only allowed corn with aatoxin up to
100 parts per billion to be used intrastate for limited purposes. FDA explained
that it could not allow the higher level in interstate commerce because it could
not suciently monitor the ow of the corn in interstate commerce to ensure
that it would only be used for permissible purposes, and this presented an un-
reasonable risk that the corn could be used to feed dairy or very young animals,
or even for human consumption.72 Even the opportunity for intrastate use of
the corn at 100 parts per billion level was limited under the earlier exemption,
because many of the states involved were likewise unsure of their ability to mon-
itor their use of the more contaminated corn within the state, so FDA said that
blended corn with a higher level than 20 parts per billion of aatoxin should
not be used for any purpose.73
In 1980, prior to the authorization for the second period of exemp-
tion, a recourse loan program was instituted, from Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion, USDA, to provide price supports as interim nancing which would enable
producers of aatoxin contaminated corn to hold the corn, so that they might
have the opportunity to take advantage of the various procedures for utilization
of this corn, which were still being developed at that time, including treating
the corn with ammonia, or using it to make gasohol, as well as an additional pe-
6743 Fed. Reg. 14122 (April 4, 1978), supra note 64.
6846 Fed. Reg. 7447 (January 23, 1981).
69Id. at 7448.
70Id.
71Id. at 7447.
7243 Fed. Reg. 14122 (April 4, 1978), supra, note 64.
73Id.
12riod in which blending would be permitted, which eventually did occur.74 The
recourse loans were for a period of nine months, after which time they could be
paid back with interest (if the producer had been able to make use of one of the
procedures to make a prot from the corn), or the corn could be destroyed, and
the producer could apply for disaster relief which could be used to pay the loan
back.75
In 1982, as part of an overall reevaluation of the policies for regulat-
ing aatoxin contamination in feed for food-producing animals, FDA announced
a revised action level for aatoxin in cottonseed meal, raising the level from 20
parts per billion to 300 parts per billion.76 The specic change instituted was
the result of severe aatoxin contamination beginning with the 1980 cotton crop
in the southwestern United States. In 1982, the state of Arizona had requested
a grant of limited regulatory relief for a portion of its 1981 crop which was con-
taminated. Arizona cited the economic impact (estimated at $10.7 million) on
the state's oil mills should they not be able to market the meal for feed use. In
addition, if this meal could not be marketed, the mills would be prevented from
purchasing or processing cottonseed oil from the 1982 cotton crop, which could
result in extremely adverse consequences for the cotton industry in the state,
and the overall state economy.77
Given the previous experience with aatoxin contamination, and
the exemptions granted for contaminated corn, FDA had for some time been
studying the situation in an eort to develop a regulatory policy which would be
enforceable, while still protecting the quantity and quality of the food supply.
Scientic information had advanced by this time indicating that feed with an
aatoxin level above 20 parts per billion was not harmful to animal safety, and
would not result in harmful residues in meat and eggs from animals which ate
such feed, and studies had progressed to the point that FDA felt that the action
level could be set at 300 parts per billion for such animals.78 FDA found that
a level of 100 parts per billion in the total rations fed to livestock presents
no reasonable risk to them or to the human food derived from them, and the
cottonseed meal generally constituted no more than 11% of the total livestock
rations, so the levels could be considerably higher and still be safe. However,
because the contaminated meal could be used with other aatoxin contaminated
substances, or concentrated as a larger amount of the rations, FDA set the
limits at 300 parts per billion.79 The change did not extend, however, to dairy-
producing animals, as studies were still in progress to determine the safety and
7445 Fed. Reg. 63833 (September 26, 1980); 7 C.F.R. Part 1421.
75Id.
7647 Fed. Reg. 33007 (July 30, 1982).
77Id.
78In establishing the new level, FDA used the criteria of x406 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C.
346) and the regulations implementing it at 21 C.F.R. Part 509, requiring that contaminants
be limited to the extent necessary to protect health, while taking into account that some level
of contamination may be unavoidable in spite of good manufacturing practices. Thus, FDA
was required, in making this decision, to balance risk with availability.
7947 Fed. Reg. 33007 (July 30, 1982), supra note 76, at 33008.
13extent of aatoxin residues which might occur in their milk.80
Problems with aatoxin contaminated corn resurfaced in 1983, this
time extending beyond the southeastern states, prompting FDA to create an-
other exemption period, during which the regulatory policy adopted was similar
to that used during the earlier crisis situations in 1978 and 1980. Corn with aa-
toxin levels between 20 and 100 parts per billion could be shipped in interstate
commerce, provided that state agencies implemented a control plan, approved
by FDA, to assure that the contaminated corn would only be used to feed ma-
ture beef cattle, swine and poultry, and would not be diverted to use in feed
for immature or dairy animals, or human consumption.81 One unique feature
of this plan, however, was FDA's national enforcement eort, which included
sampling corn in interstate commerce, with emphasis on corn which is intended
for use in corn products or on dairy farms, and on states not participating in
the program. FDA also tested milk and milk products for aatoxin as part of
its enforcement eort.82
FDA noted that by channeling the contaminated corn into the safest feed
uses, the exemption relieved pressure on producers on the local level to process
contaminated corn into human food or to use it as feed for dairy animals. FDA
therefore encouraged states to adopt similar policies and control plans for corn
produced and used intrastate, and to monitor aatoxin levels in milk, or corn
intended for human food.83
In 1989, FDA issued a Revised Compliance Policy Guide, which
attempted to clarify the levels of aatoxin contamination in corn intended for
use in animal feed, at which charges of adulteration might be brought under
the FD&C Act.84 For a case to be brought claiming adulteration under
x402(a)(1) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 342), the government would have to
show that there is a reasonable possibility of harm. Therefore, FDA reasoned,
the action levels should be established such that FDA believes higher levels
would satisfy the may render it injurious test.85 FDA noted, however, that
action levels should be viewed as guidelines, rather than bright line rules, as
there might be cases in which the government would want to bring actions
below the DALs, and other times when there might be reasons not to enforce
the levels when they are violated, such as the exemptions granted for aatoxin
contaminated corn.86
The notice also contained an announcement that under its discretion as to
the enforcement provisions of the FD&C Act, FDA would not object to the
blending of aatoxin contaminated corn from the 1988 harvest with noncon-
taminated corn to produce a mixture with a level of aatoxin contamination
which is less than the pertinent action level, provided that the blended corn was
80Id. at 33007|33008.
8148 Fed. Reg. 53175 (November 25, 1983).
82Id.
83Id.
8454 Fed. Reg. 22622 (May 25, 1989).
85Id. at 22623; see also x402(a)(1) of the FD&C Act; 21 U.S.C.x342(a) (1).
8654 Fed. Reg. 22622 (May 25, 1989), supra note 84, at 22623.
14intended to be used only for animal feed.87
The revised action levels are: 200 parts per billion aatoxins for
corn used in feed for breeding beef cattle, 200 parts per billion for corn intended
for nishing swine, and 300 parts per billion for corn intended for feedlot beef
cattle. The original action level of 20 parts per billion would remain for corn
intended for use by humans, for corn used to make feed for immature animals
or dairy animals, or for corn the intended use of which is not known. Action
levels for aatoxin in uid milk products also remained unchanged.88
2. Response to the Aatoxin Contamination Exemptions
In Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,89 petitioners brought
suit on behalf of public interest groups and consumers,90 challenging FDA's
regulation of contaminants in food, and most particularly aatoxin in corn.
The initial suit, led in District Court, attacked FDA's action levels for aa-
toxin in that it violated rulemaking procedures under the FD&C Act, consti-
tuted a legislative rule issued without required notice and comment procedures,
and violated the FD&C Act because it allowed blending of adulterated corn
with unadulterated corn.91 The District Court granted summary judgment for
FDA.92
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that FDA was required
to set formal tolerances instead of informal action levels. Thus, since the action
levels were invalidated, CNI's argument that notice and comment procedures
were required to be utilized in enacting it was moot, and the issue as to whether
the blending allowed violated the FD&C Act, the court said, should be reeval-
uated on remand.93
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the FD&C Act
was not so clear as to preclude FDA's interpretation of the Act as allowing FDA
discretion to promulgate or not promulgate tolerances, and to choose to proceed
by way of action levels, and that therefore FDA's view was suciently rational
to prevent review by a court to substitute its own judgment for that of FDA.94
On remand, the Court of Appeals considered the two issues not addressed by
the Supreme Court, whether notice and comment procedures were required, and
whether allowing blending without enforcement was a violation of the FD&C
Act. FDA argued that its action levels were interpretive rules, mere nonbinding
statements of agency enforcement policy, and therefore notice and comment
procedures were not required. CNI claimed, however, that the action levels
restrict enforcement discretion enough to be considered legislative rules, for
which notice and comment procedures would be required.95
8754 Fed. Reg. 22622 (May 25, 1989), supra note 84.
88Id. at 22623.
89818 F.2d 943, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 294 (1987).
90hereinafter collectively referred to as CNI.
91Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, supra note 89, at
945.
92Id.
93Id. at 945; see also, 757 F.2d 354.
94Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, supra note 89, at 945; see also, 106 S.Ct. 2360.
95Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, supra note 89, at
15The court identied two criteria for interpretive statements of pol-
icy, that they have no present eect and impose no rights and obligations, and
that the agency and decision makers remain free to exercise discretion.96 The
court concluded that the action levels at issue in this case had present eect and
were binding. It found support for this conclusion in the way that the action
levels were described, as well as the fact that producers had to request exemp-
tions. The fact that the action levels were not completely binding, in that FDA
would still have to prove adulteration if an action were brought, and a producer
would not, therefore, automatically be subject to enforcement proceedings for
violation of the action level, was not sucient to call the action levels policy
statements, the court said, because they so limited agency discretion.97 The
court noted that FDA remained free, under the Supreme Court decision, to
maintain informal tolerances. However, the substantive eect of the action lev-
els at issue here made them impermissible. Thus, the court held that FDA
action levels were legislative rules, subject to notice-and-comment requirements
which had not been observed, and therefore could not be allowed to stand.98
The court also found, however, that although CNI was correct in
noting that when uncontaminated corn was blended with corn contaminated
with aatoxin beyond the DAL, the resulting blend was adulterated (which
FDA did not dispute), this meant only that FDA could choose to bring enforce-
ment proceedings, not that it is required to do so. Such enforcement decisions,
the court concluded, are vested with FDA. Thus, FDA could not be required to
institute enforcement proceedings against food producers who created adulter-
ated food by blending adulterated and unadulterated corn.99
D. Criticism of the Policy Against Blending
The theory behind the long standing policy against blending has
been explored throughout this paper. It is clear that if blending were allowed,
there would be increased concerns that food might be mixed with non-food
substances,100 or that good food could become contaminated with worthless or
945|946.
96Id. at 946.
97Id. at 946|949.
98Id. at 949. The distinction between interpretive policy statements and substantive legisla-
tive rules has been challenged throughout the various areas of FDA discretion, as producers
and manufacturers have sought notice and comment and other formal procedures. The ex-
istence of fairly recent cases would seem to indicate that this controversy has not yet been
solved. See eg. Professionals and Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 847 F. Supp 1359
(S.D. Texas 1994) (compliance policy guide prescribing when manufacture adulterated or
unapproved new drugs for human use at state licensed pharmacies is beyond traditional phar-
macy and nay be subject to enforcement action was an interpretive statement rather than a
substantive rule, so notice and comment procedures were not required, and the policy was not
subject to an injunction.); Heterochemical Corp., et. al. v. FDA, 741 F.Supp 382 (E.D.NY
1990) (where FDA published a notice initiating enforcement procedures, it was required to take
mandatory enforcement steps.); Bellarno v. FDA, 678 F.Supp 410 (E.D.NY 1988) (FDA im-
port alert which required that all American goods returned pharmaceuticals must be detained
and reexported unless importer provided documents establishing complete chain of custody
was invalidated by FDA's failure to conduct notice and comment rulemaking procedures.).
99Id. at 949|950.
100See eg. United States v. O.F. Bayer & Co., et. al., supra notes 26|30.
16even harmful food.101 Thus, the continuation of the present policy prohibiting
blending would appear to be consistent with FDA's purposes of preserving the
integrity of the food supply and preventing economic adulteration.
1. Issues as to the National Food Supply
Other equally valid policy concerns, however, argue in favor of eliminating
the absolute prohibition against blending. The most notable issue in this regard
is the fact that if blending were available to reduce the presence of lth or other
contamination, the food at issue could be added to the national food supply
rather than destroyed. This point is shown to be relevant in light of the fact that
when FDA has granted limited exemptions to the policy against blending,102 the
rationale behind these exemptions has been that there would be a substantial
adverse impact on the food supply if the items involved were destroyed.
The argument has been made for years that a regulated policy to allow
blending would have a positive eect on the food supply, and that concerns
as to the availability of sucient food at aordable prices might necessitate a
reevaluation of FDA prohibition of blending.103
Hutt raises the possibility of allowing blending under certain limited circum-
stances. He specically mentions animal feed as one context in which blending
might be appropriate, and suggests that there might be other similarly limited
circumstances in which blending could be allowed, which would result in an in-
crease in the size of the food supply, while at the same time protecting its quality.
Hutt concludes that given the status of the world population and food supply,
blind adherence to the current policy against blending is not justiable.104
McNamara likewise believes that destruction of food which violates
a defect action level is becoming increasingly harder to justify , if blending could
bring the lot of food below the DAL.105 He particularly points to circumstances
in which the contamination is unavoidable, manufacturers have utilized CGMPs,
and are not at fault for the defect, and no health hazard is presented.106
2. Impact on Pesticide Policies
One specic policy area in which the potentially arbitrary nature
of the system of DALs and the prohibition against blending to achieve compli-
ance with them has become apparent is pesticide residues in food.107 According
to policies and regulations coordinated by FDA and EPA, tolerance levels for
pesticide residues are established for raw agricultural commodities. Processed
101see text accompanying notes 31-51, supra.
102as in the situations involving aatoxin contaminated corn and cottonseed meal, discussed
in Part C-i, supra, text accompanying notes 64-88.
103See eq. Peter Barton Hutt, The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of Adul-
teration and Misbranding of Food, 33 FDC L.J. 505 (1978); Stephen H. McNamara, Some
Legal Aspects of Providing a Sucient Food Supply for a Hungry Population, 30 FDC L.J.
527 (1975).
104Hutt, supra note 103, at 525.
105McNamara, supra note 103, at 533.
106Id. These are, of course, the conditions under which FDA authorized exemptions for
aatoxin contamination when concern with the food supply justied it.
107Edward Dunkelberger and Richard A. Merrill. The Delaney Paradox Reexamined: Regulation Pesticides in Processed Food.
48 Food & Drug L.J. 411 (1993).
17foods made from these commodities are considered adulterated if the level of
pesticides in the resulting product is higher than that allowed for the raw com-
modity, unless an allowance is made for the higher level.108
Because processing often tends to concentrate pesticides occurring
in raw agricultural products, pesticide levels are quite likely to exceed the ac-
cepted level for the raw commodity unless the pesticide level in the raw com-
modity is substantially below the accepted tolerance. Dunkelberger and Merrill
suggest that perhaps the response to this should be to set the tolerance levels
for raw commodities suciently low so that the use of pesticides would have to
be restricted.109 Instead, they note, the approach appears to have been to set
articially high tolerance levels for processed food, to avoid the problem, but
increase the risk to the public.110
Food considered adulterated by pesticides after processing can not
be blended with other food to lower the pesticide level if the processed food
is ready to eat, and the producers of such food will be required to declare the
pesticide as a food additive and seek its inclusion as such. Controversy has
continued to swirl, however, as to the meaning of ready to eat. It appears
that the language was designed with the hope that very few things would be
considered ready to eat.
However, Dunkelberger and Merrill argue that the emphasis of poli-
cies regarding pesticides should be on the amount of risk to the public. Whether
the food in question is a raw agricultural commodity, or a processed food, the rel-
evant inquiry should be whether the risk is more than negligible, and the bulk
of the regulatory eort should be geared toward eliminating those pesticides
which are most harmful and protecting against foods which contain them.111
As for other pesticides, which carry less risk, allowances might be made for the
concentration which occurs in processing.112 This is consistent with the view
of those who have advocated wider use of blending, and FDA'S position when
exemptions have been created and blending has been allowed; it should only be
permitted when it can be achieved without risk to the public.
3. Problem of Case by Case Consideration
In addition, the case by case nature of the system by which exemp-
tions are now obtained and blending is occasionally permitted has also been a
source of controversy, which has led some to question FDA'S regulatory power
and discretion.113
As a result of the decision in Community Nutrition Institute
114
v. Young,114 FDA proposed a rule which would make its advisory
108See 23 Fed. Reg. 9511, 9511-12 (December 9, 1958); 24 Fed. Reg. 2434, 2434-35 (March
28, 1959) (FDA regulations implementing Food Additives Amendment).
1099Dunkelberger and Merrill, supra note 103.
110Id.
111Id.
112Id.
113See eg. Community Nutrition Institute v. Young, supra note89.
114supra note 89; see text accompanying notes 89 through 99.
18opinions, guidelines and policy statements non-binding. Although such
statements would remain FDA's best advice on the subject, they would no
longer be considered a formal statement of FDA position,
and enforcement actions contrary to these statements would be
115
possible.115
Some commentators have expressed the belief that these statements
would continue to be made and relied on anyway, and the new position would
be ignored.116 Kracov and Brady note that FDA's new view of these statements
could decrease the amount of information available to food producers and con-
sumers, hinder product development and lessen consistency of compliance.117
They suggest adherence to policy statements and guidelines unless there is some
specic reason to deviate from them, and take a hierarchical approach to the
various types of guidance documents, stressing that FDA should pay particular
attention to making sure that the most important and substantive of these doc-
uments will still be uniformly interpreted and applied, to decrease the potential
negative eects.118
Thus, the decision as to whether a given action requires notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures, or is an interpretive rule or policy statement
must be made on an individual, case by case basis. Following the decision in
Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,119 FDA will have to use notice-and-
comment procedures in the future to create an exemption to the prohibition
against blending. This will only make it more unwieldy for FDA to make an
exemption when it believes one is necessary, and therefore make it more di-
cult for FDA to ensure an adequate food supply. If FDA were to change its
regulations to make greater general use of blending, this decision, too, would
go through notice-and-comment procedures, but at least when it was through,
the policy would stand, and specic exemptions would not be needed. This is
further support for the idea that blending should be considered, at least in some
limited circumstances, such as those in which it has been successfully authorized
by exemption in the past.
4. Computerized Blending in the Future?
Finally, one indicator that blending may be even more desirable
in the future is that researchers are looking at ways to accomplish blending
by computer.120 Thus far, computer-aided blending research has touched on
such areas as the aroma of wine and juice, preventing spoilage of milk and
determining the age and variety of cheese.121
115See 57 Fed. Reg. 47,314 (Oct. 15, 1992).
116See eg. Daniel A. Kracov and Robert P. Brady,
Food and Drug Administration Advisory Opinions and Guidance Documents After Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,
48 Food & Drug L.J. 47(1993).
117Id.
118Id.
119supra note 89.
120Computer-aided Blending Finds Wine, Juice, Cheese, Milk, Fish Applications, Emerging
Food R & D Report (June 1, 1993).
121Id.
19Who knows if one day they might be able to use a computer to detect
lth and determine the appropriate type and amount of blending to eliminate
the adulteration without risk to the consumer. Perhaps computers could even
alleviate the enforcement concern most commonly raised to prevent alteration
of the blending policy, by detecting covert blending, thereby allowing FDA to
catch those who might attempt to take advantage of the ability to blend, to
deceive the consumer with a cheaper or worthless product.
Conclusion
It may be in the best interests of the integrity of FDA as an institution,
as well as food producers and the overall food supply, to nd a way to make
blending work. Now, as FDA has been forced on several occasions to allow
blending to avert disastrous consequences, perhaps the benets of a wider policy
of regulated blending, which have become increasingly more apparent, will be
more attractive to FDA. It certainly would take a great deal of study, but it
could be done.
As with the aatoxin exemptions, FDA would rst have to determine the
levels at which various substances subject to blending would be harmful (pre-
sumably the DAL, which should already exist). The exceptions have shown
that an approved plan for blending can be created and maintained by food pro-
ducers and manufacturers, with supervisory assistance from state governments.
FDA could contribute some enforcement by testing of samples, as it did during
the 1989 aatoxin exemption, and could provide for severe penalties to those
who would violate approved regulations. Thus, FDA would have some means
of ensuring that blending would not be abused.
FDA'S justication for its present policy has been that it must protect the
consumer and the food supply, and that to allow blending would open the door
to intentional adulteration to make products more cheaply. However, given the
competing concerns, FDA is not really protecting either the consumer or the
food supply by not allowing blending, as the food supply is in danger of being
inadequate, because food is destroyed as a result of natural and unavoidable
defects which could be alleviated so that they would not be harmful to the
public.
The growing population produces many challenges for FDA, and FDA will
undoubtedly cope with this in a variety of ways. However, it is likely only a
matter of time before the policy against blending will need to be altered. It
may take another crisis, such as the previous aatoxin situations, to nally
bring about the change, and of course it remains to be seen the extent to which
such a change will be practicable, but it appears the time is fast approaching
for serious discussion and a move toward at least some limited change in the
present policy.
20